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THE FUTURE OF GAMBLING IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Gary Sokolow*
Background and Scope
This article will analyze the legislative and legal issues that arise
from gambling on Indian reservations. First, a general overview
of Indian country gaming will be presented. Next, the federal
government's attempt, through existing laws and proposed leg-
islation, to deal with this situation will be discussed. A review
of pending legislation will be emphasized. The existing case law
will then be analyzed. Finally, an analysis of competing federal,
tribal and state interests in gambling regulation will be discussed,
followed by a look at future prospects.
The federal government has regulated gambling in Indian
country only since 1924. Traditional Indian games were not the
focus of these regulations. In that year, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) adopted tribal gaming ordinances for the purposes
of its Code of Federal Regulation Courts.' Only recently has
Indian gaming become a significant economic activity in Indian
country.
In a June 17, 1986 survey, the Department of the Interior
reported that 108 tribes had gaming facilities, 104 of them
involving bingo.2 Some tribes operate both bingo and card games,
and others run only card games.3 No tribes are currently known
to operate pari-mutual dog racing, horse racing, or jai-alai.
Gross receipts of all tribes conducting such activities exceeds
$100 million annually.4
The tribes, like other governmental entities, use these revenues
largely for the economic, educational, and health benefit of their
members. The expansion of gaming into Indian country and the
recent proliferation of court decisions on the subject have aroused
the interest of both the states and the Congress.
* J.D., 1988, University of South Dakota. First place award, 1987-88 American
Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. S. REP. No. 493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
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Federal Regulation of Gambling in Indian Contry
Assimilative Crimes Act (A CA)
To date, Congress has not seen fit to directly regulate Indian
gambling activities. However, the federal government is not with-
out remedies to apply against the existence of such operations.
These so-called "remedies" are in the form of criminal prose-
cutions, which seek to ban such activities, rather than merely
regulate the time, place, and form of gambling. The first such
possible "remedy" is the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which
allows federal officials to punish those crimes which are not
included in the federal criminal code, by applying tHe applicable
state law.5 The ACA is an interstitial measure, reflecting the fact
that the states, and not the federal government, are the usual
arbiters of criminal conduct.6 At least one commentator has
suggested, however, that the ACA is not an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction over these activities. 7 He suggested that the
ACA is applicable to Indian reservations only through the General
Crimes Act (GCA),8 subjecting it to the exceptions of the GCA,
and as a result, since non-Indian matters are exempt from OCA
coverage, the ACA would therefore not then apply to. non-
Indians. 9
This interpretation is not unanimously accepted. Another writer
takes the view that the ACA is a mere transformation of state
law into federal law.'0 Under this view, federal regulation would
simply turn on whether a state had outlawed such activity. Federal
officials would then have to regulate gambling activity on a state-
by-state basis, determining whether or not that state regulated or
prohibited gambling. Such an analysis will be discussed later, in
the context of Public Law 280' and the civil/regulatory - crim-
inal/prohibitory analysis. The ACA is not a very solid basis on
which to regulate Indian gambling. The word "regulate" implies
some form of permission, as opposed to the outright ban of the
activity in question.
5. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969).
6. United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. Guzman, Indian Gambling on Reservations, 24 Amiz. L. Rnv. 209, 212 (1982).
8. General Crimes Act, I8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988).
9. Guzmaan, supra note 7, at 212.
10. Comment, Indian Sovereignty Versus Oklahoma's Gambling Laws, 20 TUSA
L.J. 605, 622 (1985).
11. Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a))
(1984).
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Gambling Devices Act
Another form of federal control of gambling, albeit a special-
ized one, is the Gambling Devices Act (GDA), which generally
bans the use of certain gambling devices.'2 The GDA specifically
prohibits the use of such devices as slot machines in Indian
country.' 3 However, the GDA prohibits only certain gambling
paraphernalia, not the conduct of games per se. But if the federal
government wants to stop the use of slot machines, for example,
this act effectively cripples such gaming operations. That is what
occurred in United States v. Sousseur1 4 However, Sousseur relied
on the ACA to allow the seizure of slot machines, since state
law prohibited the use of such equipment. In Sousseur, neither
the United States nor the tribe had such a law or ordinance
prohibiting the use of slot machines.'$
Two federal cases which have construed the GDA held that
while the United States may seize such gambling devices on Indian
reservations, the GDA does not extend to the regulation of the
conduct of gambling itself.' 6 The ODA, like the ACA, is of
limited application, especially in the bingo context, as many of
the games do not utilize such equipment as the GDA defines.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
A far more potent weapon in the hands of federal regulators
is the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA),17 which is
a general federal law of national application prohibiting large
scale gambling. The OCCA makes it a federal crime to operate
a gambling business "that is a violation of the law of a state
... in which it is conducted."' 8 As its name implies, the OCCA
was passed largely to take aim at organized crime.' 9 There is
nothing in its legislative history which suggests that the authors
of the act had Native American gambling activities in mind.?
The wording of this statute raises two issues concerning its en-
forcement in Indian country.
12. Gambling Devices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1171-1178 (1982).
13. Id.
14. 87 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.Wis. 1949).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 369 F.Supp. 562, 565 (D.Mont. 1973); United
States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 1980).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1974).
18. Id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess § 2 (1970).
20. Guzman, supra note 7, at 212.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1990
154 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
The first question concerns infringement on the "ability of
tribes to make their own laws and be governed by them"-the
Williams v. Lee'1 infringement test. The Sixth Circuit, in United
States v. Dakota, decided that the OCCA applies to Indian
country in Michigan because the OCCA extends federal, not state
jurisdiction into Indian country, thus precluding any infringement
of state authority over Indian tribes.Y That case found that the
infringement test did not apply because the Williams test concerns
state and not federal government infringement upon tribal sov-
ereignty.Y Dakota merely followed the prevailing analysis on this
issue. The court also upheld the enforcement of the OCCA in
Indian country, since the elements of the crime as set forth in
the OCCA and the relevant state law were present.2
The second question involved is whether a general federal law
such as the OCCA can be applied in Indian country, absent a
clear indication by Congress to that effect. United States v. Farris,
a Ninth Circuit case, held that the OCCA does apply in Indian
country.'5 The court simply reasoned that unless Congress says
to the contrary, federal laws apply with equal force in Indian
country.2
The implications raised in this second question in Farris are
not nearly so clear as is the infringement issue. To take the Farris
holding to its logical conclusion further modifies the well-estab-
lished case law, which holds that tribes (at least those federally-
recognized) possess some measure of inherent sovereignty. Tribal
sovereignty is again curtailed. To hold that all federal laws apply,
unless specifically exempted by Congress, greatly diminishes in-
herent tribal sovereignty. No nation expects to live by another
sovereign's laws without that nation's consent. Nonetheless, the
Farris view, echoing United States v. Montana and United States
v. Wheeler, is the prevailing view on that point.z? Finally, Farris
found that Congress never intended to allow Indians to freely
engage in the very gambling activities that it forbade other citi-
zens.28
21. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
22. United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir. 1986).
23. Dakota, 796 F.2d at 188.
24. Id.
25. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 893-94 (quoting United States v. wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) and United
States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 894.
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The Public Law 280 status of a state is not a factor which
affects the applicability of the OCCA in Indian country. But we
need not apply the prohibitory/regulatory dichotomy to the OCCA
to determine whether or not gambling activity violates state law.
Dakota and Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission
Indians v. Duffy confirmed this, the latter case holding that the
true test of the applicability of the OCCA is "whether [the] tribal
activity is [a violation of state law] ... depends on whether it is
contrary to the public policy of the state." 29
It should be realized that the OCCA, like the ACA and the
GDA, does not give states themselves the right to enforce these
laws, which would give rise to infringement problems. There is
nothing in any of these acts which suggests that states may use
them to enforce their own statutes, even though the ACA and
the OCCA borrow state law in order to find violations of federal
law. This "borrowing" of state law is consistent with constitu-
tional and case law, which gives Congress "plenary" powers to
regulate dealings with the Indian tribes. 0 To date, the United
States Department of Justice has not vigorously enforced the
OCCA, perhaps because recent federal policy supports tribal
economic self-sufficiency. 3
Proposed Congressional Regulation
Ninety-Eighth Congress
Only in the last few years has Congress moved to regulate
gambling activity on Indian reservations. Congressional interest
in this issue began in the Ninety-Eighth Congress with House Bill
4566, which sought to impose federal licensing requirements on
Indian gambling enterprises, with a governmental commission
within the Interior Department supervising the entire scheme."
The operation of this legislation was somewhat analogous to the
Nevada Gaming Commission, which closely regulates the em-
ployment of workers, the licensing or gambling establishments,
and the operating rules of the gaming industry. The Nevada
commission also requires extensive disclosure of employee and
operator financial interests.
29. Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Dakota, 796 F.2d at 188.
30. See e.g., Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
31. 19 WNEmLY Comp,. PaRs. Doc. 98 (Jan. 24, 1983).
32. H.R. 4566, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
No. 1]
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House Bill 4566 was introduced in response to Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Butterworth, which held that under certain circum-
stances, states cannot regulate bingo on an Indian reservation.33
This bill died in committee and it was not heard from again in
that Congress. Support for the bill was decidedly mixed among
Indian communities. One group of tribes supported it as a
clarification of existing lawA4 Other groups opposed it on grounds
of infringement upon tribal sovereignty."
Ninety-Ninth Congress
In 1985, with the Ninety-Ninth Congress, several bills on this
subject were again introduced. The most noteworthy were Senate
Bill 902, Senate Bill 2557, and House Bill 1920. Senate Bill 902
established certain federal standards for Indian gaming, with
Secretarial approval required of tribal ordinances and manage-
ment contracts. 6 A gambling commission was also established
in that bill, but its powers and structure were not delineated.
The standards for the tribal gaming ordinances and resolutions
required that they be "at least as restrictive as [the] prevailing
state law. ' 37 Thus, the tribe might as well adopt the state law
on the subject, as it is left with no real choice of its own.
Much more comprehensive in scope than Senate Bill 902 was
House Bill 1920, which set up a National Indian Gaming Com-
mission, acting for the Secretary of the Interior, which again
was required to approve of tribal ordinances and management
contracts. This legislation also required that revenues generated
from the gambling on the reservation only be used to support
tribal governmental functions.38 In this bill, for the first time,
three classes of gambling were established: Class I covered the
traditional Indian forms of gaming and gave the tribes exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate them; Class II included such games as
bingo, which required commission approval of ordinances reg-
ulating same, thus giving the tribes and federal government
concurrent jurisdiction over such gaming; and finally, Class III
gaming included all other forms of gambling such as pari-mutual
33. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
34. Indian Gambling Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 4566 Before the Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 96-97
(1984) [hereinafter House Hearings].
35. Id. at 101.
36. S. 902, 99th Cong., 1st Sess § 11 (1985).
37. Id. at §§ 5-6.
38. H.R. 1920, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § Il(b)(2)(i)-(iv) (1986).
[Vol. 15
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wagering on horse and dog racing, and jai-alai. 39 The jurisdic-
tional aspects of Class III gambling are unclear from a reading
of the bill.
Under House Bill 1920, the review of management contracts
was the second area of major authority given the commission.4
Evidently, there had been some overreaching by outside (non-
tribal) management firms hired to run the gambling enterprises.
Such overreaching occurred when the outsiders took a dispro-
portionate share of the profits, when they did not account to
the tribes for their income, and when they signed contracts for
an unduly long period of years. On this last point, one case of
a twenty-year contract term has been reported. House Bill 1920
curbs overreaching by setting a maximum contract term of five
years, requiring strict accountability standards, and excluding
felons from participating in these enterprises.41 Under this bill,
a member of the tribe's governing body is excluded from having
any interest in the management contract.4 2
Finally, under House Bill 1920 a tribe need not be federally
recognized to be subject to this bill. It is sufficient for the tribe
merely to be eligible for services provided Native Americans by
the Secretary of the Interior.4 3 These two definitions are not
necessarily the same. The latter one broadly includes those tribes
ineligible for, or that may have not yet completed, the BIA's
formal tribal acknowledgment process, but nonetheless under
certain statutes qualify for certain services. Native Hawaiians
are an example of one group who do not qualify for federal
recognition as an Indian tribe, yet they are eligible for certain
Native American programs administered by the Secretary of the
Interior. Lands which fall subject to this bill include Indian
reservations and, under certain circumstances, newly acquired
tribal lands.
The Reagan Administration then had Senate Bill 2557 intro-
duced as its answer to the emerging problems of Indian gam-
bling." This measure was a response to the perceived inadequacies
of House Bill 1920. Assistant Attorney General John Bolton, in
summarizing his objections to House Bill 1920, cited a lack of
39. Id. at 19(5)CA)-(C).
40. Id. at § 12.
41. Id. at § 12.
42. Id. at § 12(e)(1)CA).
43. Id. at § 19(4).
44. Jones, Gambling on Indian Reservations - Update February 17, 1987, CoN-
aRnSSioNA, REsA~c SERvicE, LmRARY o CoNoRSS (1987).
No. 1]
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rigorous regulation in the form of strict licensing procedures
and accounting and auditing procedures. 45
There were several significant differences between Senate Bill
2557 and other bills which came both before and after it. Under
this bill, tribally operated bingo would be forbidden in any state
which does not also permit bingo, an apparent answer to court
holdings which have construed Public Law 280 in a gaming
context. The commission's operating expenses would be assessed
against the tribally operated bingo operations. A major differ-
ence between this bill and others was its concentration on bingo,
to the exclusion of other forms of gambling. Senate Bill 2557
regulated gambling in terms of bingo and little else. The regu-
latory scheme established by House Bill 1920, however, was
more detailed than in any bills previously considered.
Like House Bill 1920, Senate Bill 2557 provided criminal
sanctions in Title 18 of the United States Code for violations.
Unauthorized gambling offenses would be handled in a manner
similar to the ACA, inasmuch as these sanctions would apply
prevailing state law and subject the offender to the same pun-
ishment as the state would mete out for like offenses. 46 A
separate section on theft carried its own fines and imprisonment
sanctions. 47 These sanctions effectively created concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction over violations of state gambling laws
in Indian country. Specific language in Senate Bill 2557 delegated
to the states the jurisdiction to try such cases, unless the "cir-
cumstances justify" a federal prosecution. 48 Justifiable circum-
stances were not further clarified in the legislation. Lastly, the
bill created a special class of crimes, using state law, which
granted concurrent jurisdiction in both the federal and state
governments.
One Hundredth Congress
These bills also died in Congress, falling to either come up
for a vote in the appropriate House and Senate committee, or
to get a do pass committee recommendation for a full House
and Senate floor vote. More recently, the 100th Congress con-
sidered Senate Bill 555, introduced on Feb. 19, 1987 by Senators
Daniel Inouye (D.-Hawaii) and Thomas Daschle (D.-S.D.). Both
serve on the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, the former as
committee chairman.
45. Id.
46. S. 2557, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. § 401 (1986).
47. Id.
48. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/4
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This bill was similar in form to the previous ones. Its authors
justified it on the basis that the patchwork nature of Indian
jurisdiction made application of criminal laws in Indian country
somewhat unsettled. Further justification was the need to clarify
the legal status of gambling in Indian country.49 Inouye and
Daschle also found the need to shield the tribes from the cor-
rupting influences of organized crime (though only one such
incident has been documented).
In the definitional section of the bill, "Indian lands" were
defined as those within a reservation or held in trust by the
United States for any person or tribe, or lands "held by any
tribe or individual subject to restrictions by the United States
against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises gov-
ernmental power." 50 It is conceivable, then, that a gambling
establishment could be put on land within the reservation which
is owned by an individual tribal member, subject only to tribal
jurisdiction. That individual would then be able to receive rent
payments from that gaming operation on his land.
Under section 7 of this bill, a National Indian Gaming Com-
mission would have wide-ranging powers to regulate the conduct
of gambling. Only two of the five commission members must
be members of a federally recognized Indian tribe. As a result,
Indian gaming could be controlled by non-Indians. That possible
result is clearly inconsistent with the often repeated federal policy
of tribal self-determination. The Commission could conduct
audits, inspect all books and gaming premises, and generally
monitor Indian gaming activities.5 1
Like House Bill 1920, Senate Bill 555 established three classes
of gaming, with the jurisdictional schemes remaining identical
to the earlier bill. There were two requirements, however, for a
tribe to engage in Class II gaming (bingo-type games). The first
directed the tribe to enact an ordinance regulating such activity,
and second, this gaming must not be of a type completely
prohibited by a state. 2 For the purposes of the bill, if a state
permits gambling in some form, however limited, then the sec-
ond requirement for Class II gambling would be met. Appar-
ently, that requirement was designed with the prohibitory/
regulatory Public Law 280 analysis in mind. Such activity would
be prohibited in Indian country if the state in which the reser-
49. S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 2 (1987).
50. Id. at § 4.
51. Id. at §§ 6-7.
52. Id. at §§ 4-5.
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vation is located also prohibits it. The tribe may then regulate
Class II gambling, subject to Commission supervision of certain
details of the operation. A tribe must also meet the eligibility
requirements for a state license. The conduct of Class III gam-
bling would be made a violation of federal law, subject to some
very narrow exceptions. 53
Another restriction upon tribal sovereignty imposed by Senate
Bill 555 was the requirement that all gambling revenues be
dedicated only to tribal governmental operations or for the
welfare of individual tribal members, tribal economic develop-
ment, other charitable organizations, or to help local government
agencies fund their operations. This last point is analogous to
a federal grant of impact funds to state and local governments
in order to compensate them for the loss of tribal trust lands
from the property tax rolls. Tribes may make per capita pay-
ments to members, subject to some restrictions: 1) the tribe must
have a Secretarial-approved plan for allocation, and 2) all such
payments are expressly made subject to the federal individual
income tax.5 4
Another significant portion of the bill provided for a transfer
of tribal jurisdiction to the state, Public Law 280 notwithstand-
ing, if the tribe elects to be freed from Commission regulation.5
Any such transfer must be initiated by the tribe and then
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, prior to it becoming
effective.5 6 The bill did not say whether the cessation of tribaljurisdiction is only in relation to civil and criminal incidents
arising from the gambling enterprise. 57 Perhaps the ambiguities
of this provision made it unlikely that the tribes would use it,
fearing that such a consent will "open the floodgates" to the
continued erosion of their sovereignty. Apparently, only Class
III gambling transferred to state jurisdiction could be held ex-
empt from state assessments for the costs of law enforcement,
as long as the revenues derived therefrom are used solely for
the general governmental purposes of the tribes.
Section 12 of the bill dealt with the issuance of management
contracts, providing in part that contracts may not exceed a
term of five years,58 providing tribes a certain guaranteed min-
53. Id. at § I1(d).
54. Id. at § 11(b).
55. Id. at §§ 11(c), (d).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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imum payment with a priority over the retirement of develop-
mental and construction costs, 59 and strict financial disclosure
(corporate and individual) accounting requirements. 6° The sub-
section dealing with the minimum guaranteed payment to the
tribe was unnecessarily vague. It would allow the tribe to receive
virtually nothing if the tribe became a victim of overreaching
by an outside management company. A tribe, using its own
consultants, could set up its own operation, with a minimum of
outside help (at least one all-Indian consulting firm exists to do
just that). A steadily increasing number of tribal members at-
tending college would be equipped to make the tribes more self-
sufficient, resulting in less dependence on outside help.
Section 14 dealt with civil penalties, allowing the commission
chairman to fine and collect up to $25,000 for violations of this
act.61 The alleged violator could appeal such a levy to the full
commission.6z This provision would probably be challenged in
court for a built-in conflict of interest, as such fines collected
would be used to defray the operating expenses of the commis-
sion. The same people fine, collect and expend the funds.
Section 15 of Senate Bill 555 provided an aggrieved defendant
the right to appeal a commission-imposed fine to the appropriate
federal district court and thence the usual appeals route.63 De-
cisions made by the full commission regarding licensure, fines,
and other related matters would be considered final agency
decisions for the purposes of the Adminstrative Procedures Act."
The Commission was vested with investigative and subpoena
powers, but the Attorney General would have the discretion to
either enforce or decline to enforce such subpoenas.5
Under section 18 of Senate Bill 555, the commission may tax,
subject to certain limits, each tribal gaming operation to help
defray its expenses." If the tribe operates a thriving Class III
gaming operation, it could reduce its tax burden by electing out
of the commission's jurisdiction (and subsequent assessments)
by requesting a transfer to state jurisdiction. A tribe might have
a lower tax burden under state regulation. But the long run
effect of such a move would bring with it some high costs, not
59. Id. at §§ 12(a)(2), (b).
60. Id.
61. Id. at §§ 14(a)(1), (b)(1).
62. Id.
63. Id. at §§ 14(b)(1), 15.
64. Id.
65. Id. at §§ 16-17.
66. Id. at §§ 17-19.
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the least of which would be a further erosion of tribal sover-
eignty. This would be an additional state encroachment in what
has been an exercise of that tribal sovereignty.
Section 20 of the bill permitted, only under very narrow
circumstances, the establishment of a gaming operation on newly-
acquired (after the enactment date of this act) Indian trust lands.
There appeared to be only one exception to the requirement
that tribal gaming operations be conducted on new trust lands:
the governor of the state involved must give his consent, after
determining that such a move would not be "detrimental to the
surrounding community." 67
The effect of this section would likely foreclose a tribe ob-
taining land in a town or city, off the reservation, and then
establishing a casino. A governor would probably accede to such
a request only if 1) the area was economically depressed, 2) the
tribe agreed to hire a significant number of non-Indian employ-
ees, 3) the gaming operation reimbursed the town or state for
additional law enforcement expenses, and 4) it was politically
safe or advantageous for the governor to do so. On this last
point, there may be a great resentment against a tribe establish-
ing what many non-Indians would perceive as an enterprise free
of state taxation and regulation. Unfortunately for Native Amer-
icans, a vast amount of misinformation abounds regarding their
political status as tribes. Citizens might not view such guber-
natorial approval as a "righting of past wrongs," regardless of
the nature of those wrongs.
At least tribes with an existing reservation could gain addi-
tional land with "gaming rights" through land acquired through
the settlement of an outstanding land claim.6 Terminated tribes
restored to federal recognition could establish gaming houses on
lands they re-acquire pursuant to such a re-recognition. 6 In the
final analysis, an existing tribe such as the Oglala Sioux, for
the purposes of gambling enterprises, would be subject to their
present boundaries. The presumption built into Senate Bill 555
was that no newly acquired lands after the enactment of this
bill could be used to establish any Class II or III gambling
operations.
Section 23, the final major section of Senate Bill 555, ad-
dressed criminal sanctions for violations of this act. Unlike the
previous bills that have been discussed, this section exempted
67. Id. at § 20.
68. Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 15
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Class I and II gaming already regulated by this act.70 As did
the other bills, this section likewise borrowed state law to see if
a federal gambling offense has been committed.7' The major
difference between this and previous bills was that the United
States has exclusive criminal jurisdiction for violations of this
act, with transfer of such jurisdiction to the state subject to
tribal consent.72 To many tribes, this would surely be preferable
to state jurisdiction, for historical reasons. Given the prolifer-
ation of Indian gaming enterprises, federal criminal sanctions
would be sure to put additional burdens on the federal court
and penal systems.
Under section 23, theft from gaming establishments by offi-
cers, employees, or any one else, was made punishable by fines
up to $250,000 and prison terms of up to five years.73 These
criminal provisions would make for an ever-increasing federal
presence on the reservations.
At the time of this writing, this bill was pending in the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs. House of Representatives
Bill 964, which was introduced at the same time as Senate Bill
555, was substantially the same as its Senate counterpart.
Competing Tribal, Federal, and State/Local Interests
Tribal Interests
The concerns which were expressed on earlier bills are the
same as those expressed for the currently pending legislation.
Fundamentally, the entire argument comes down to the com-
peting interests of all three sovereigns: tribal, federal, and state/
local.
The most obvious interests of the tribes on this issue is that
of economic development. For example, the Florida Seminole
tribe grossed $20 million at all three of its bingo sites in 1982,
with a net profit of $2.7 million dollars returned to its 1500
members that year.74 This is welcome news to those tribes who
do not possess an abundance of natural resources. The ability
to attract tourists and non-Indian residents alike to the reser-
vation represents a feasible way for a tribe to stabilize its
economy.75 One tribe sees these gambling bills as a way to
70. Id. at § 23.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at §§ 23-24.
74. DeDomenecis, Betting on Indian Rights, CALIF. LAwYE, Sept. 1983, at 29.
75. Id. at 31.
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"legitimize" the tribes' efforts to become truly self-sufficient! 6
Aware of state concerns as to the stability of these enterprises,
some of the tribes, such as the Fon Du Lac of Wisconsin, have
enacted comprehensive bingo gambling ordinances which address
many of the state and federal concerns of the bills.7 It appears
that the revenue raised from these ongoing enterprises is used
to benefit the welfare of tribal members, through tribal expen-
ditures on the health, welfare, and education of tribal members.
Unforiunately, at the time of this writing, there is no survey
available which indicates precisely how the gambling revenue
earned by the various tribes is used. It is not doubted that
gambling activities are potentially able to provide employment
for members, and in turn, allow increased spending by both the
tribe and its members, on and off the reservation. Indeed, tribes
such as the small Cabazon Band of Mission Indians count such
gambling revenues as its only source of income independent of
state or federal government aid.
Tribal sovereignty is the final major Indian interest to be
addressed here. The dilution of tribal powers as embodied by
these bills is viewed by the tribes as the major problem with
this legislation. 8 From the foregoing analysis of these bills, it
is evident that just such a weakening of meaningful tribal self-
determination may occur. Another layer of bureaucracy would
be added within the federal government to "check up" on tribal
activities. Federal or state standards, not tribal standards, would
apply to the evaluation of prospective Indian gaming ordinances
adopted pursuant to this legislation. These bills reach beyond
mere Secretarial approval of tribal council ordinances to an
ongoing audit and regulation of what are essentially those types
of activities usually termed governmental police powers: those
of regulating the conduct of business, social, or other enterprises
on the reservation.
But at least one Indian group, a body of tribal chairmen
solicited by the Interior Department for a study of this issue,
did not view this legislation as an incursion into tribal sover-
eignty.79 Instead, they saw these bills as a way to protect tribal
government rights.80 Just how that would be accomplished was
not explained.
76. Gambling on Indian Reservatons and Land: Hearings on S. 902 Before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-85 (1985) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings].
77. Id.
78. H.R. RFS. No. 488, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986).
79. Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 84.
80. Id.
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Federal Interests
In fact, President Reagan embraced the Nixon Administra-
tion's goal of meaningful tribal self-determination. 8' It would
appear that encouraging Indian gambling activities would ac-
complish just that. In a 1983 statement of federal Indian policy,
Reagan encouraged tribes to reduce their dependence on the
federal government by developing their economies, and in turn,
their governments.82 Some people might view this statement as
another attempt at termination of the federal-Indian trust rela-
tionship. Unfortunately, his statement offered little help in clar-
ifying his views on gambling activities as a road to self-sufficiency.
The President discussed self-sufficiency largely in terms of a
tribe's natural resources, the lack of which seems to serve as
the impetus for gambling activities on the reservations. 83 A rough
pattern emerges here in that those tribes which already have
abundant natural resources appear to have little interest in con-
ducting gambling activities.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a unified federal
response to this issue. While the BIA seems to favor Indian
gambling as a means to self-sufficiency,84 the federal courts and
the Justice Department raise the specter of an infiltration of
organized crime into Indian country.85 This fear of organized
crime is a recurring theme in the federal government's support
of this legislation.8 These same would-be federal regulators do
not see the tribes as efficient self-regulators against this threat.8
7
Yet to continually deny the tribe's ability to protect themselves
undermines the very policy of meaningful self-determination. If
the tribes are not seen as possessing abilities to be self-policing,
then self-determination is virtually impossible. Mistakes made
by the tribes in exercising their inherent sovereign powers serve
as a pretext for the federal government to further limit their
exercise of those dormant powers. Self-determination then be-
comes a mockery.
Congressman Norman Shumway (R.-Calif.), a prime sponsor
of this legislation, makes much of this organized crime threat. 8'
81. 19 WEEKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 98 (Jan. 24, 1983).
82. Id. at 99.
83. Id. at 100-01.
84. DeDomenecis, supra note 74, at 30.
85. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1980); see also House
Hearings, supra note 34, at 67.
86. House Hearings, supra note 34, at 67.
87. S. REP. No. 493, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1986).
88. Letter from U.S. Rep. Norman Shumway to Gary Sokolow (Mar. 2, 1987).
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His district includes several rancherias which conduct gambling
activities. He bases his conclusions of organized crime infiltra-
tion on reports by the California Attorney General's office. 9
His thoughts are but reflections of a lack of direction of federal
policy makers in this area. On one hand, he supports the Indian
effort to become self-reliant, but then he is concerned with
possible crime problems.90
State Interests
There are two state interests affected by gambling in Indian
country. The first is that of organized crime, as much a concern
of states as it is the federal government. In California v. Ca-
bazon Band of Mission Indians,91 the state expressed concern
that some non-Indian operators of one tribe's gambling opera-
tions were convicted in state court of murder and bribery.9 This
citation of organized crime infiltration into Indian country is
the only one documented. Despite the expressed concerns of
several state attorneys general of this crime threat, not one of
them, except California's attorney general in Cabazon, could
allege any specific instances of organized crime infiltration into
Indian reservaions in their states. Indeed, the victory of the
Cabazon Band in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on
this subject indicates that the state, from an evidentiary point
of view, has not demonstrated a compelling need for state
intrusion into Indian country.
Essentially, the states have made their case for closer regu-
lation of Indian gaming activities on the possibilities of what
might happen.9 3 They rely on the threat of organized crime
infiltration, while not realizing that perhaps with federal coop-
eration, tribes may in time be able to effectively police these
activities. Arguments also have been made that lower tribal
standards may make policing more difficult. 94 One commentator,
a member of the Nevada Gaming Commission, favors tight
control over Indian gambling, arguing that even the legislation
heretofore introduced greatly underestimates the complexity of
the subject. 95 His argument for tight federal/state control is
premised on his experience in Nevada, which had a history of
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2.
91. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
92. Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 127.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 158-60.
95. Id.
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criminal infiltration until tough regulatory laws were passed.9 6
But the relatively new Indian experience in the area would enable
tribes to account for previous non-Indian experiences when en-
acting their own gambling control ordinances. While corruption
in Indian country is possible, as it is elsewhere, that possibility
alone should not be seized as a pretext to burden all tribes with
heavy federal or state regulation. All proposed legislation has
failed to differentiate between those tribes with sophisticated
law enforcement systems and those with none at all.
The second, but more subtle state interest in Indian gaming
involves a threat to state sovereignty. Simply put, the states
have argued that there is no justification for treating gaming
activities differently by virtue of their location inside or outside
of Indian countryY7 The argument has been made that a bal-
ancing test should be applied between the economic interests of
the tribes and the interests of the state in protecting its citizens. 9
States naturally resent the lack of control of activities within
their borders. But it is necessary that the states show some
evidence of a compelling need for state regulation, a "test"
implicitly reached by dicta in the Cabazon case. 99 In the final
analysis, the status of gambling in Indian country, absent federal
regulation, has rested on a judicial balancing test of tribal versus
neighboring state interests. The days when the reservations were
truly isolated from non-Indian communities are long past.
Case Law
Public Law 280 States
In response to the inevitable conflict among the three sover-
eigns, the courts have applied a variety of tests to attempt to
solve the issue. The first test, the prohibitory/regulatory analysis,
has its roots as an interpretational aid in Public Law 280 states.100
One purpose of this law was to attempt to bring some order to
the chaos of detemining the civil jurisdiction in Indian country.
Criminal jurisdiction was, and is, a more settled area of Indian
jurisdiction than is the civil side. The law was passed during the
termination era of the 1950s, as a way to "mainstream" tribes
into state jurisdictional analysis and to ease the federal govern-
ment out of the "Indian business."
96. Id. at 154.
97. H.R. REP. No. 488, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986).
98. Senate Hearings, supra note 76, at 19.
99. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221 (1987).
100. See supra note 11.
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The legislative history of Public Law 280 indicates that Con-
gress saw the need to extend state civil jurisdictioii into Indian
country, because the tribes were not fully developed according
to Anglo-American concepts of law.'0' Many tribes are, of course,
far more "developed" today than they were in 1953.
The first modern case to explore the applicability of Public
Law 280 in a civil/ regulatory-criminal/prohibitory context was
Bryan v. Itasca County.102 That case involved the imposition of
a state mobile home tax on an Indian in Indian country. A
reading of Public Law 280 could lead to the conclusion that alljurisdiction which is not reserved to the tribes or federal gov-
ernments such as subjects covered by treaty or matters of tax-
ation, were delegated to the states.'01 Facially, PuUlic Law 280
grants states "jurisdiction over offenses" and "civil causes of
actions" arising in Indian country, and also mandates that state
laws shall have the same force and effect in Indian country as
they have elsewhere in the state.10'
But Bryan rejected such a broad reading of the law. Looking
at the law's legislative history, Bryan found that a major purpose
of the act was to combat lawlessness on the reservations.0 That
court read Public Law 280 in pari materia with the 1950s-era
termination acts and determined that if Congress had intended
to give states general regulatory powers over Indian tribes, it
would have expressly said so.?° Since the termination acts them-
selves give states broad jurisdiction over tribal property, and
allowed state taxation of income earned in Indian country, it
must be presumed that Congress' failure to mention this in
Public Law 280 excludes such powers. Such a reading is consis-
tent with the canons of construction, generally construing am-
biguous statutes in favor of Indian tribes.' °7
Bryan begins to develop the distinction between civil/regula-
tory and criminal/prohibitory laws for Public Law 280 states.
The broad contours of this statute deal with conduct that is
proscribed by law; i.e. criminal acts. The very essence of criminal
law is to prohibit conduct which is deemed harmful to and by
101. 1953 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADmN. Naws 2412.
102. F. CoHEmN, HANDBOOK OF FEDmAL INDmx LAW 362-63 (1982 ed.); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
103. F. CoHmN, supra note 102, at 363.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a) (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a);
F. CoHEN, supra note 102, at 363.
105. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 378-79.
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society. Of course such conduct may also be sanctioned by the
imposition of civil penalties. Public Law 280 focuses on behavior
which is generally prohibited, as opposed to that which is al-
lowed, with restrictions.
Far less clear in the Public Law 280 case law are regulatory/
civil acts which, by definition, may not be activities deemed so
harmful that they must be banned altogether. For example,
gambling or fireworks use are generally not thought to be so
harmful that a total ban is required. Instead, such activities are
regulated in order to minimize the harm to people. Such deci-
sions rest on a state's public policy, as embodied in its legislative
enactments. But in Public Law 280 states, mere labels are not
determinative of whether that law can be used by a state to
forbid gambling in Indian country. 18 Such a determination of
Public Law 280's applicability to Indian country gambling must
be made on a case-by-case basis, analyzing the nature of the
applicable state laws involved.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth was just such a
case. 10 The case involved the Seminole Tribe's bingo operation
in Indian country. The Hollywood, Florida bingo hall is right
in the middle of a large metropolitan area, overwhelmingly
populated by non-Indians. The state then has a great interest in
regulating such an enterprise, both for revenue-taxation and law
enforcement reasons. Nonetheless, instead of balancing compet-
ing interests, the Fifth Circuit chose to apply a narrow Public
Law 280 analysis, Florida having recently assumed total Public
Law 280 jurisdiction in Indian country.110 The Butterworth court
examined Florida gambling laws (particularly those pertaining
to bingo) and found a regulatory and not a prohibitory intent
in those laws."1 Among the factors which militated in favor of
the Tribe (a regulatory finding) were: 1) the state allows certain
groups to gamble, and 2) the existence of an inference drawn
from a reading of those laws that bingo is treated by Florida
as a form of recreation, albeit closely regulated.1 2 The Butter-
worth court found that a prohibitory interpretation of the Flor-
ida gaming laws could be implied-but using the canons of
construction, it construed the ambiguities in favor of the Indi-
ans. '3 Once that court reached the opinion that Florida bingo
108. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
109. Id.
110. Fx. STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (vest 1975).
111. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 316.
112. Id. at 314.
113. Id.
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gambling laws were civil/regulatory in nature, the racial identity
of the parties, whether they be game operators or players,
became irrelevant." 4 From the Butterworth case, it appears that
when the law in question is found to be civil/regulatory in
nature, the states are excluded from enforcing their bingo or-
dinances, even if the operators are non-Indian, as was the fact
in this case.
Wisconsin, another Public Law 280 state, similarly lost its
case in Lac du Flambeau Band v. Williquette.n 5 That state had
a stronger case than did Florida. It historically had prohibited
all forms of gambling, punishing violations with criminal sanc-
tions including imprisonment.16 Wisconsin's undoing was a re-
cent state constitutional amendment, which exempted bingo and
raffles from the gambling prohibition. In response to this change,
the Lac du Flambeaus established a bingo hall on their lands in
Indian country, and the state subsequently attempted to assertjurisdiction over such activity. The games conducted by the Lac
du Flambeaus were precisely those permitted by the state and
though the games were not state licensed, the court concluded
that the Wisconsin bingo laws were civil/regulatory in nature,
not the type of laws envisioned in the grant of Public Law 280
jurisdiction to the state.17
Lac du Flambeau followed Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis-
consin v. State of Wisconsin, which earlier had reached the same
result over state bingo laws."' Oneida also analyzed the state
public policy and gambling laws, concluding that Public Law
280 jurisdiction must be denied Wisconsin in relation to gam-
bling in Indian country." 9
California, a third Public Law 280 state, similarly lost several
cases which addressed this same issue. The first case involved
was Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians
v. Dulyy, where under slightly different facts, the Indians pre-
vailed. Unlike the previous cases mentioned, the Barona Indians
lived on a very small reservation, with few enrolled members. 20
That court followed earlier decisions, ascertaining the intent and
114. Id.
115. Lac du Flambeau Band v. Williquette, 629 F. Supp. 689 (W.D.Wis. 1986).
116. Id. at 691.
117. id. at 692-93.
118. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin v. State of Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 719
(W.D.Wis. 1981).
119. Id.
120. Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/4
GAMBLING IN INDIAN COUNTRY
effect of the state gambling laws, whether or not such gambling
was permitted elsewhere in the state, applying the canons, and
finally, accounting for the historical disfavor of state jurisdiction
in Indian country, to find no state jurisdiction in this case.' 2'
Recently, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the criminal/prohibi-
tory-civil/regulatory analysis as applied to Public Law 280
states.'2 The two bands of Indians (Morongo and Cabazon) in
this case, like those in Barona, were small, the Cabazon with
twenty-five members and the Morongo with 730 members.'2
These bands conducted card and bingo games pursuant to tribal
ordinance. The state sought to prohibit such games under both
Public Law 280 and the OCCA.
In construing section 4 of Public Law 280,17A which grants
limited civil jurisdiction in Indian country to the state, the Court
followed its earlier analysis in Bryan by looking at the legislative
history of the law to determine that section 4 applied only to
private civil litigation involving Indians.121 Bryan involved a tax,
unquestionably civil in nature. However, gambling can easily be
considered both civil and criminal in nature, depending on a
state's public policy towards such activity. With respect to Public
Law 280, Cabazon held that whether the [gambling] conduct
violates state public policy is the first test.'1 Cabazon, as in
numerous cases below, reviewed the state's widespread tolerance
and encouragement of gambling-as manifested in the presence
of a state lottery, pari-mutual horse racing, and numerous pri-
vate bingo halls-and found that California's bingo laws are
essentially civil/regulatory in nature.'27
The state also attempted to argue that the presence of criminal
sanctions in the bingo laws permit a criminal/prohibitory label
to attach to such laws. The Cabazon court rejected such rea-
soning on the same grounds as did the Butterworth court.'2
The Supreme Court, adopting the Butterworth logic, reasoned
that to permit such a result of labelling would permit a Public
Law 280 state to merge tribal sovereignty into its own. 29 Such
121. Id. at 1190.
122. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987).
123. rd. at 209 n.1.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).
125. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207-08.
126. Id. at 209.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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a scenario, given the history of state-Indian relations, would
allow a state, under the rubric of Public Law 280, to reverse
decades of federal Indian policy. All that the state need do to
prevent the tribe from exercising its own jurisdiction in Indian
country is to attach criminal sanctions to any laws it wishes to
apply there. Inherent tribal sovereignty would then mean vir-
tually nothing as a Public Law 280 state could then unilaterally
extend its jurisdiction into Indian country.
Arguably, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)"10 could
then operate to prevent such a result. The ICRA, which amended
Public Law 280, required tribal consent to any further assump-
tion of state jurisdiction in Indian country. No tribe that wants
to establish gaming would likely assent to this.
Finally, once such laws are found to be regulatory in nature,
the state is without jurisdiction in Indian country over any
players or operators of gambling enterprises, whether or not
they are Indian. The facts of Cabazon seem to indicate that all
that is needed for immunity from regulation by a Public Law
280 state is a tribal ordinance controlling the gambling and.state
tolerance, however limited, of that activity. The site of the
operation must meet the Indian country analysis of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151 in order for the regulatory/prohibitory Public Law 280
analysis to be applied. If the site of the gaming is not in Indian
country, then of course it would be subject to state jurisdiction
like any other entity. While 18 U.S.C. § 1151 is a criminal
jurisdictional statute, the Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District
County Court'3' and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of
Arizona'32 have held the section 1151 Indian country definition
to apply also to questions of federal and tribal civil jurisdic-
tion.133 It appears then that the law is now relatively well settled,
with respect to Indian country gambling issues in Public Law
280 states.
Non-Public Law 280 States with Special Jurisdictional Acts
It should be noted, however, that Public Law 280 applies
only to a minority of states. What then is the rule in non-Public
Law 280 states? Some of these states have special jurisdictional
acts of Congress which authorize state criminal and/or civil
jurisdiction in Indian country.
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341.
131. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
132. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
133. F. CoHN, supra note 102, at 27.
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For example, in Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, the state relied
upon the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980
(MICSA),3 4 to preclude the Penobscots, a federally recognized
tribe, from operating a high stakes beano parlor on its newly-
established reservation. 135 That court rested its decision of state
jurisdiction in Indian country on an interpretation of the state
implementing act (authorized under MICSA), which allows tribes
exclusive jurisdiction only over "internal tribal matters.' 36 Such
"internal tribal matters" under title 30, section 6204 of the
M.R.S.A., part of the state's Maine Implementing Act, did not
mention gaming, traditional or otherwise, and the court did not
find the conduct of beano to so qualify.137 The Stilphen court
relied on the fact that beano is not a traditional Indian game,
nor "did it have any particular cultural significance to the
[Penobscot] Nation." ' The fact that the proceeds of the games
were used to finance tribal activities did not qualify the games
as internal tribal matters.139 The Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal of the Penobscot Nation on the grounds of a lack of a
substantial federal question.14°
Kansas, another non-Public Law 280 state, in Iowa Tribe of
Indians v. State of Kansas also successfully assumed jurisdiction
over the Iowa Tribe for the state law offense of selling pull-
tabs cards (in connection with bingo games) on the reservation.14 1
The state relied on the Kansas Act of 1940,142 which gives the
state jurisdiction over those crimes (so-called minor acts) not
enumerated in the federal Major Crimes Act.43 Iowa Tribe relied
heavily on the legislative history of the Kansas Act to find that
Congress meant to cede jurisdiction to the state for such "minor
acts" and also that the tribes in Kansas do not possess and have
not for many years possessed tribal courts.'" In effect the Iowa
Tribe court believed that the 1940 Act was passed to fill a void
in tribal law enforcement in Kansas. 45 But that holding poses
134. Pub. L. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1721-1735).
135. Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 490.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 464 U.S. 923 (1983).
141. Iowa Tribe of Indians v. State of Kansas, 787 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1986).
142. 25 U.S.C. § 217(a) (1940).
143. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 1153, 3242).
144. Iowa, 787 F.2d at 1439.
145. Id. at 1439-40.
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trouble for the oft-subscribed notion in federal Indian law of
inherent tribal sovereignty. True sovereignty does not necessarily
imply that the failure to exercise authority (i.e. the absence of
tribal courts), causes tribes to lose that authority. No sovereign
necessarily loses power by the failure to exercise its authority.
Yet that is exactly what has happened here.
The state of Connecticut did not fare so well in Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan.'4 Although Connecticut is not a
Public Law 280 state, the McGuigan court nonetheless applied
the regulatory/prohibitory analysis to determine that the state
bingo laws only serve to regulate, not prohibit, bingo in that
state.147 The court employed that analysis because the Mashan-
tucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act 48 parallels Public
Law 280's grant of "limited civil jurisdiction" to the states. 49
Thus, the act falls into that category of states covered by special
Congressional enactments which cede to the state certain juris-
diction over Indian tribes in Indian country. The act was passed
to settle land claims of the Indians there. The law established,
inter alia, a new reservation in exchange for the extinguishment
of long-standing land claims against the state and federal gov-
ernments. So far, all cases examined involved either Public Law
280 states or those states with special jurisdictional acts of
Congress.
States Without Public Law 280 or Special Jurisdictional Acts
The final group of states which remain subject to an analysis
of state jurisdiction are all of the other non-Public Law 280
states-those without special jurisdictional statutes. The basis
for an assumption of state jurisdiction, under these circum-
stances, is far less clear than it is in Public Law 280 states, now
that the Supreme Court has spoken in the Cabazon case. The
four basic theories advanced in these cases are an infringement
on tribal sovereignty, the balancing of tribal/state/federal inter-
ests, the OCCA, and preemption. As is true of many issues in
Indian law, there is no single standard or test which the federal
or state courts apply.
In State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, a state court
decision, the Seneca Tribe won only a partial victory 5 0 The
146. 626 F. Supp. 245 (D.Conn. 1986).
147. Id. at 246.
148. Pub. L. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (1983) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760).
149. McGuingan, 626 F. Supp. at 248.
150. State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985).
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Oklahoma Supreme Court would permit state regulation of tribal
bingo activities only to the extent that it affected non-member
Indians or non-Indians.Y5" By implication, then, member Indians
involved in bingo are free of state regulation over such activities.
That court allowed limited state jurisdiction under a balancing
of the interests test, asserting that the state need for revenues
and protection of Oklahomans from organized crime justifies
limited state jurisdiction in Indian country. 15 2
In May, preemption and infringement are summarily dis-
missed, the latter on the ground that bingo is not a "traditional
tribal activity."1 13 The court, in attempting to balance the inter-
ests of all sovereigns, acknowledged the tribe's need for eco-
nomic self-development, but not at the expense of the state. 54
From a full reading of the case, based on what was discussed
(balancing), and what was not (infringement or preemption), it
is clear that the court was seizing upon any possible pretext to
permit some state jurisdiction over these activities. In May, the
state of Oklahoma did not appear to argue any compelling needs
of the state such as tax revenue or a problem with organized
crime. The lack of any meaningful discussion of these legitimate
state interests, given the fact that the state relied on a balancing
approach, is puzzling.
Another argument advanced by states is the applicability of
the OCCA to Indian country. But federal court decisions have
consistently held that while the OCCA makes gambling in federal
enclaves a federal crime, if such activity is unlawful in the host
state, the act cannot be used by state officials to assert state
jurisdiction in Indian country. 55 In United States v. Dakota,
the United States, not the state of Michigan, brought a declar-
atory action against the Keweenaw Indian Bay Community for
operating a gambling casino on its reservation. 5 6 That court
declined to apply the Public Law 280 civil/criminal analysis, as
Michigan is a non-Public Law 280 state. 57 Simply put, the court
found that the casino violated state law, and therefore, the
OCCA. Similarly, in Farris, the Ninth Circuit upheld the con-
victions of both non-Indians and member Indians for a violation
151. Id. at 92.
152. Id. at 91.
153. Id. at 90.
154. Id. at 90-91.
155. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1987);
United States v. Dakota, 796 F.2d 186, 186 (6th Cir. 1986).
156. Dakota, 796 F.2d at 186.
157. Id. at 189.
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of the OCCA.15 8 That court, notwithstanding the special tribal/
federal trust relationship, or more specifically, the canons of
construction, found that the OCCA, like other federal laws of
general application throughout the United States, applies with
equal force in Indian country. 5 9 In dicta, Cabazon permits only
the federal government to apply the OCCA in Indian country.' 6
As to infringement analysis in non-Public Law 280 states,
both Farris and Cabazon make it clear that the Williams v. Lee
infringement test is inapplicable to a federal application of the
OCCA in Indian country.' 6' The Williams case concerned the
attempted exercise of state jurisdiction on an Indian reservation.
It noted the historical tension between state and tribal govern-
ments. But the OCCA is an exercise of federal, not state au-
thority. States have virtually nothing to say about the enforcement
of that act.
The next argument used by both tribes and states is that of
preemption. Generally, preemption may be found to exist where
a tribe or the federal government has a long or consistent history
of self-regulation over the particular subject matter 62
In Farris, the appellants argued that 15 U.S.C. § 1175 of the
federal Gambling Devices Act served as a basis of federal pre-
emption of an application of the OCCA. That court, however,
rejected such an argument, primarily on the basis that section
1175 applies only to slot machines, while the OCCA applies to
gambling in general. 63
A much better argument for federal/tribal preemption of state
gambling laws in non-Public Law 280 states was made by de-
fendants-appellees in Langley v. Ryder (Langley I).'" In that
case, the defendants were arrested for gambling and other charges
on the Alabama-Coushatta "reservation," near Shreveport,
Louisiana. While the Coushatta lands were not an actual res-
ervation, they were treated as Indian country for the purposes
of this action. The Langley I court found for the preemption
of state laws on several grounds. 65 The first base of preemption
used was the Indian Commerce Clause, 66 which generally pre-
158. United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
159. Id. at 896.
160. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 213.
161. Id.; Farris, 624 F.2d at 896.
162. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, rehearing denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
163. Farris, 624 F.2d at 896.
164. Langley v. Ryder [I], 602 F. Supp. 335 (W.D.La. 1985).
165. Id.
166. U.S. CONs?. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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empts state regulation of Indian affairs.1 67 However, the court
bowed to the realities of close contact between whites and
Indians at the present time, tracing the softening of preemption
through Williams'68 and McClanahan,69 which permit state ju-
risdiction under certain conditions, even at the cost of some
measure of tribal sovereignty.1 70 Under the pressure of increasing
close Indian-white contact, preemption nearly dissolves into a
balancing test. Langley I found no particular overriding state
interest, such as the "lost revenue" arguments made by Arizona
in McClanahan.7' The latter case found the state asserting a
great interest in lost revenue, if that state could not tax income
earned by an Indian off the reservation. The crux of the state
argument in McClanahan was that the state provides services to
Indians both on and off the reservations. 7 2
But in Langley I, the state of Louisiana asserted no interests
which might counter the preemption arguments of the defen-
dants. 7 1 It was difficult to imagine why the state failed to argue
the existence of state interests. Nonetheless, in Langley v. Ryder
(Langley II), the state appealed the lower court finding of federal
preemption of state law, and ultimately lost to the Coushatta
Tribe.'7 4 The Fifth Circuit adopted the lower court's analysis of
preemption. 75 Reflecting the state's failure to assert any com-
pelling state interests in the conduct of bingo within Indian
country, Langley II affirmed the district court in all respects. 7 6
The essence of Langley 11 was that there was no effective
Congressional grant of jurisdiction to Louisiana within Indian
country in order to defeat federal preemption, and thus vesting
jurisdiction in Louisiana. 7 7
In a state without Public Law 280 or a special jurisdictional
act of Congress, the Langley cases offer a reasonably good basis
for an Indian tribe to assert a tribal/federal preemption of state
jurisdiciton over tribal affairs. The Coushatta Tribe was a re-
cently recognized tribe, on lands which were not in fact an
167. Langley 1, 602 F. Supp. at 343.
168. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
169. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
170. Langley I, 602 F. Supp. at 343.
171. Id.
172. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164.
173. Langley I, 602 F. Supp. at 335.
174. Langley v. Ryder [II], 778 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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established reservation in the usual sense. The land was donated
to the Tribe and subsequently accepted for them by the United
States Department of the Interior, in trust for the tribe as
authorized by section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934.178 The current federal posture of permitting Indian gaming
enterprises on reservations in the name of economic development
suggests that the states will get little help in enforcing laws with
respect to Indian-controlled gambling in Indian country.
However, the preemption test is not without limits. This test
no longer rests on a Williams v. Lee analysis, but rather a
balancing test, as the dicta in Cabazon suggests. 79 That case
balanced the ample evidence of strong federal interests, mani-
fested by President Reagan's emphasis of tribal freedom from
federal dependence, and a general federal promotion of bingo
enterprises as against the state interests of containing organized
crime.18 0
At first blush, it appears that these tribal interests might be
diminished by the Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Reservation proscription against the mere "marketing
of tax exemptions." But Cabazon distinguished Colville on the
basis that the tribes there have significant interests not present
in the latter case.18' The material distinction in fact between
these two cases on this point is that in Colville, the tribes merely
imported cigarettes for later resale, where in Cabazon, the tribes
committed significant financial resources and manpower towards
the conduct of these gaming activities. In the earlier case, the
tribes had already-existing smoke shops with no additional in-
vestment necessary in order to accommodate the cigarettes. The
present case goes far beyond merely taking advantage of tax
free status. In fact, the states argument is focused not on
taxation but the infiltration of organized crime. The case extends
to the creation of a new industry on the California rancherias,
that of recreation.
But this distinction exists only because the Cabazon case chose
to deemphasize the marketing of tax exemption argument. Had
the Supreme Court chose to follow McClanahan in this respect,
the two cases are quite analogous. Both McClanahan and Ca-
bazon in fact involve the marketing of an exemption from state
178. Id.
179. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S 202, 221 (1987).
180. Id. at 211.
181. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980); Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215-16.
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regulation. The former case involved state taxation of the res-
ervation sale of cigarettes, while the latter case involves state
regulation of bingo establishments. In both cases, non-Indians
would have no reason to patronize the Indian country businesses
if they were subject to state regulation, either in the form of
state taxes or the size of bingo jackpots. If the Court had found
the marketing argument strong, McClanahan would have served
as strong ammunition for the state of California.
The final analysis of the preemption/balancing test lies in the
nature of the interests the state of California asserted in an
attempt to demonstrate a compelling state interest, which would
be enough to override tribal and federal interests. In Cabazon,
the state's assertion of a compelling state interest failed on
evidentiary grounds.82 The state felt that the threat of organized
crime on the two reservations in this case was sufficient to
escape preemption. The Court, in Cabazon, found that argument
unpersuasive for two reasons: 1) no actual proof was offered at
trial that regulated off reservation games were free from organ-
ized crime and Indian country games weren't, and 2) the state
didn't show that organized crime infiltration actually existed
with respect to bingo and similar games, either on or off the
reservation.'83 Such a lack of proof of the existence of organized
crime or other law enforcement problems also existed in the
Cabazon case at the Ninth Circuit level.114 This same failure of
proof existed both in the Langley cases and in recent congres-
sional hearings on the subject.
Implicit in all of this is that with strong facts, where the state
failed on a Public Law 280 analysis of their bingo statutes, they
might have prevailed on a preemption or balancing test basis.
As to preemption, Louisiana, like all other states, has a long
history of gambling regulation. The Langley cases also suffered
from this lack of proof. If Louisiana, a non-Public Law 280
state, had shown strong evidence of existing law enforcement
problems, it could have made a credible case against federal
preemption of state gambling laws. The Cabazon holding already
implies that with solid evidence of past and/or present law
enforcement problems, the state might have prevailed. 185 A show-
ing of a compelling state interest might have also overcome the
182. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 219-21.
183. Id. at 221.
184. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900 (9th
Cir. 1986).
185. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202.
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infringement test. In the context of Indian-white contact, the
state almost automatically wins on a pure balancing of interests
test, as most reservation populations are vastly outnumbered by
the neighboring communities. In light of long standing rational
and oft-demonstrated state and federal/tribal interests, a strong
state showing could prevail, as it did in McClanahan.
Conclusion
In predicting the future, the first step is to consider whether
or not a given reservation (or land which meets Indian country
definitions) is in a Public Law 280 state, a state which has
specifically assumed some measure of criminal jurisdiction over
the tribes. If so, absent congressional regulation of Indian gam-
bling (as embodied in recent legislative proposals), the tribe's
success will surely depend on whether or not the state permits
the gaming activity which the tribe seeks to engage in. No cases
have 9upported an exclusion of state jurisdiction in Indian coun-
try where the Public Law 280 state has totally prohibited that
form of gambling. The Cabazon case infers that a total ban on
such activities, even without proof of law enforcement problems,
may be enough to permit state jurisiliction in Indian country.
Such a total ban would seriously weaken the preemption/
balancing tests from the tribe's viewpoint. A non-gambling state
would be able to point to a compelling need to maintain a
gambling-free state. Permitting gambling, even in Indian coun-
try, would seriously weaken these state goals. A Public Law 280
analysis would, under Seminole and Cabazon rules, compel a
decision in favor of a state. A total ban on such activities would
take the state gambling law out of the civil/regulatory category
and put it squarely into the criminal/prohibitory column-pre-
cisely the types of laws addressed by both the legislative history
of Public Law 280 and Bryan.
A total ban on gambling would also support any federal
effort to halt gambling under the OCCA. This act could be
applied to the reservation, but only by the federal government.
However, existing federal policy makes any widespread federal
prosecutions under the OCCA unlikely.
Like it or not, the concept of inherent tribal sovereignty, at
least in the gambling context, has been considered softened since
the heady days of Williams v. Lee, where the infringement test
placed a heavy burden on the states to overcome, which could
be done only by showing some compelling state interest, such
as a need to uphold law and order by applying state criminal
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss1/4
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law to reservations. This same burden also exists to some degree
in the balancing test and the canons of construction.
Cabazon is merely a continuance of a gradually discernable
trend of reducing tribal sovereignty in order to meet the exigen-
cies of state interests. These exigencies manifest themselves as a
result of ever increasing contact between whites and Indians. To
move too fast against tribes (as was the case with the Termi-
nation Acts) would offend the sensibilities of all but the most
ardent supporters of states (as opposed to Indian) rights.
The Public Law 280 analysis then becomes subsumed into the
larger picture of competing state, federal, and tribal interests,
in the name of infringement or balancing/preemption tests. The
Supreme Court's message in Cabazon appears to be that the
Court stands ready, upon a good factual showing of compelling
state interests, to blunt or jettison that Public Law 280 analysis
in favor of a straight balancing-of-the-interests test. The Court
surely indicated by inference, at least, that a strong factual
showing of law enforcement problems by the state would have
been enough to balance the interests in favor of state jurisdiction
in Indian country.
The one sure fact of Indian law is that it is a fluid concept,
subject to few permanent and enduring concepts. More than
other areas of the law, Indian law is "fact driven." One only
needs to look at both the courts and Congress to discern that
fact. Tribal sovereignty, though never in fact unlimited after the
Marshall Trilogy, is subject to gradual erosion as Indians and
non-Indians live closer together, in ever-increasing numbers. As
always, Indian rights, Public Law 280 or not, are either directly
or indirectly dependent upon state law.
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Addendum: An Update
Federal regulation of gambling in Indian Country has become
a reality. On Oct. 17, 1988, President Reagan signed the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) into law. 1 The IGRA originated
as Senate Bill 555, which was introduced in the first session of
the 100th Congress, and subsequently amended. The major fea-
tures of the IGRA were discussed previously in this article.
The one major difference between Senate Bill 555 and the
IGRA concerns the issue of a transfer of criminal and civil
jurisdiction from the tribe to the state, as it relates to gaming
disputes. Under the original bill, a tribe wanting to conduct
Class III gaming had to seek a transfer of civil and criminal
jurisdiction from itself to the state. The tribe had to get Sec-
retarial approval for this, and in fact, the Secretary was to be
the vehicle for effecting the transfer. Under section 11 (d) of the
original Senate Bill 555,' in order for the tribe to conduct such
gaming, the Secretary had to approve and, indeed, ask the state
to assume jurisdiction over gambling related matters. The effect
of this section would have put the tribe in the position of
surrendering another piece of their sovereignty to the state as
the price of conducting Class III gambling. The IGRA does not
place the tribes in such a position.
To conduct Class III gambling, the IGRA still requires the
tribes to adopt a gaming ordinance in conformity with the act,
and the measure must then be approved by the Commission
Chairman. 8 8 However, instead of the Secretary transferring ju-
risdiction from the tribe to the state, the tribe and state must
now negotiate and agree to a compact which would govern both
the actual conduct of the games and the allocation of related
civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. Such jurisdic-
tion as assumed by the state, pursuant to the act, only allows
the state to assess its law enforcement costs against the tribal
Class III game. 189 Under the IGRA, the state is expressly for-
bidden to use the compact as precedent for imposing any rev-
enue-raising taxes or assessment on any activities in Indian
country, whether gambling-related or not, if there is no other
legal basis for imposing such a tax or assessment. 19° In other
186. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467, 1988 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & ADmia. NEws 3071, (to be codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721, 18
U.S.C. 1166-1168).
187. S. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 11(d) (1987).
188. Pub. L. 100-497, § 11(d)(1).
189. Id. § 11(d)(4).
190. Id.
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words, a state is prevented from using the compact as a legal
basis to collect taxes on other activities which take place in
Indian country.
The burden to negotiate such a compact in good faith is
initially shifted to the state. A tribe may seek an order from
the appropriate federal district court to compel the recalcitrant
state to negotiate in good faith for a compact. 19' The IGRA
enumerates several factors for the court to consider in deter-
mining exactly what "good faith" means in this context. The
IGRA also contains provisions for a mediation process to de-
velop a compact in the event that both parties reach an impasse
in their negotiations. 92
In essence, the IGRA seeks to avoid the "all or nothing"
result of transferring jurisdiction to the state at the expense of
tribal sovereignty. This new approach mirrors the desire of
Congress to strengthen the hand of the tribes in dealing with
the jurisdiction issue. 93 Congress balanced the state concerns of
crime prevention with the tribe's historic and continuing oppo-
sition to any imposition of state jurisdiction into tribal lands. 94
The IGRA now gives the tribes a significant voice as to the
nature of state jurisdiction on gambling in Indian country.
Other differences are of a relatively minor nature, focusing
mainly on exempting particular lands from provisions of the
IGRA. At this point it is interesting to note that the revised
version of Senate Bill 55519- provided that a majority of the
Commission members were to be members of federally-recog-
nized tribes. The enacted version of Senate Bill 555, the IGRA,
deleted that provision, leaving Indian members in a minority of
two. 95 Nothing would prevent the President, of course, from
appointing more than two Indian members to the Commission.
One can only speculate as to the reasons why a provision calling
for majority Indian membership on the Commission was deleted.
Only time will tell how well the IGRA, discussed in Congress
for over five years, actually works. At least the tribes and the
states now have a framework in which to solve their differences
over who should regulate gambling in Indian Country.
191. Id. § 11(d)(2)(B)ii).
192. Id. § 11(d)(7).
193. S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmv. NEws 3083.
194. Id.
195. S. 444, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(b)(3) (1988).
196. Pub. L. 100-497, § 5(b)(3).
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